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Abstract.  We invited “residents” of a virtual world who vary in real-world age and 
occupation to play a trust game with stakes comparable to “in world” wages.  In 
different treatments, the lab wall was adorned with an emotively suggestive 
photograph, a suggestive text was added to the instructions, or both a photo and text 
were added. We find high levels of trust and reciprocity that appear still higher for 
non-student and older subjects.  Variation of results by treatment suggests that both 
photographic and textual cues influenced the level of trust but not that of 
trustworthiness. 
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  1Trust among the Avatars: A Virtual World Experiment, 
with and without Textual and Visual Cues 
 
 
  In recent decades, laboratory decision-making experiments have become a 
standard part of the economist’s toolkit for testing theories of economic behavior, with 
the majority of experiments being conducted in university computer labs using students 
as subjects.  While some results have been replicated using more diverse subject pools 
and while many replications suggest that inferences from student behaviors are not 
necessarily misleading, it is widely agreed that including more broadly representative 
subject pools in experiments would be desirable.
1   
  One reason most experiments continue to study students is that a properly 
incentivized experiment is costly, and most students already on a university campus have 
far lower opportunity costs of getting to an on-campus lab and participating in an 
experiment there than do individuals engaged in full-time employment in other locations.  
For experimenters, too, the costs of setting up experiments in other locations can be high 
relative to conducting them on campus.  Thus, experimenting in university labs with 
student subjects carries substantially lower monetary and logistical costs.  
  
  The possibility of reaching a larger and broader subject population with modest 
logistical costs and cost per subject sparked our interest in conducting an exploratory 
experiment in a virtual world.  Participants in the life-like on-line platform Second Life 
come from a broad demographic spectrum, and it has been estimated that about thirty 
thousand people are engaged in some activity in Second Life (including holding paid 
jobs, selling products, furnishing virtual homes, and socializing) at any given moment.  
We wanted to investigate the potential of this medium and population as venues for 
conducting economics experiments with diverse participants at reasonable cost.   
  The experiment we chose is the Trust Game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe (1995, hereafter BDM) and subsequently replicated, with or without 
                                                 
1 To be sure, experimental economics has come a long way since the days when nearly all experiments took 
place at universities.  There are examples of experiments in which the subjects are fishermen, peasant 
farmers, pastoralists or even hunter-gatherers in developing countries (see, for example, Henrich et al., 
2001, Carter and Castillo, 2002, Barr, 2003, and Karlan, 2005) or truckers (Burks et al., 2007) and 
businessmen (Fehr and List, 2004) in developed ones, and remarkable cross-country comparisons have 
been done (e.g., Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter, 2008).  Nonetheless, a substantial majority of decision-
making experiments in economics are still conducted at universities using students as subjects. 
  2modification, in many settings (a partial survey is provided by Camerer, 2003).  One 
reason for this choice is the game’s simplicity: only two players need be matched, each 
makes a single decision, and the choices can be consecutive rather than simultaneous, so 
that no subject group as such need be assembled.  Another reason is the game’s intrinsic 
interest as a prominent illustration of how rational calculations intersect with social 
dispositions, and as an important tool for studying a problem lying at the heart of much 
economic interaction (Arrow, 1974).  How the social element in the trust game will play 
out in the anonymity of the virtual world is a matter of both theoretical and practical 
interest, the latter owing to the fact that trust in e-commerce and virtual environments has 
commercial and other applications (Benbasat, Gefen and Pavlou, 2008; Chesney, Chuah 
and Hoffman, 2009).  
  In addition to conducting a standard trust game in order to compare results of an 
otherwise similar protocol with different environments and subject pools, we decided to 
experiment with our virtual lab by varying two dimensions and performing exercises in 
comparative statics.  First, we varied the physical environment by placing one of two 
photographs, or none, on the virtual lab room’s wall, following a recent psychology 
experiment suggesting strong susceptibility of social behaviors to subtle but economically 
irrelevant cues (Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006)).  While this kind of environmental 
manipulation could also be done in a brick-and-mortar lab, ease of handling digital 
images in the virtual environment makes it particularly easy to implement in a manner 
that is salient while its treatment status remains unrecognized by subjects. Second, we 
varied the ideational environment by adding differently suggestive wordings at the 
conclusion of the instructions of two treatments.
2  While this is easy enough to do in a 
physical lab, we wanted to contrast the impact of words with that of pictures in the same 
setting.  In both dimensions of variation, we contrasted a trust-encouraging to a trust-
discouraging treatment and each to the baseline experiment which closely follows BDM.  
We also implemented treatments that include both visual and textual cues. 
                                                 
2 An example of an experiment in which the impact of suggestive text is demonstrated is Dal Bó and Dal 
Bó (2009), who find that including certain passages as a form of “moral suasion” in the instructions of a 
public good game has transitory effects in the absence of punishment opportunities and lasting effects when 
there is an opportunity to punish. 
  3Our virtual lab visually resembled a conventional one, with an entry area (see 
Figure 1) containing a receptionist, a portal (“teleporter”) to individual experiment 
rooms, and six such rooms each designed to comfortably seat one subject.  The subject 
pool differs from that in most university experiments in having a much broader range of 
ages and occupations (we discuss problems of verification below).  Subjects participated 
from any location allowing internet access, and did so from at least 39 different countries.  
Data collection was 100% automated and ran twenty-four hours a day with a round-the-
world subject pool. 
Potential problems are posed for experimenters by the fact that subjects visit the 
virtual lab in the guise of “avatars,” with information they provide about their real world 
demographics being difficult to verify.  Possibly subjects might have their avatars act in 
ways that they themselves would not.  Also, the same individual might play multiple 
times using different avatars, although this danger can be minimized (see below).  The 
heightened anonymity of interactions among such subjects may have its advantages, 
however, in that a potentially worrisome desire to please the experimenter (so-called 
“experimenter demand effect”) is attenuated because no embodiment of the experimental 
team appears in the lab (the receptionist was an automaton, and clearly so).  There is a 
potential drawback from the lack of hard evidence of counterpart authenticity;
3 yet if 
subjects act, under such extraordinarily anonymous conditions, according to social norms 
and in the expectation that others also will do so, this would be strong evidence that such 
behaviors and beliefs are deep-seated.  
Average choices by our first-movers are remarkably similar to those in BDM.  In 
contrast, our second-movers are significantly more trustworthy, rendering trusting 
profitable (whereas it is slightly unprofitable on average, in BDM).  Each of our photo 
and word manipulations shifts trust in the direction expected, illustrating the potential of 
the medium, while also introducing some new observations about the powers of different 
kinds of interventions (for instance, whereas the trust-discouraging cue has the larger 
                                                 
3 For internet-mediated (but not virtual world) experiments, Eckel and Wilson (2006) find that subjects’ 
doubts that there is a real counterpart affect first but not second-mover behaviors in a trust game.  Lack of 
certainty that there is a real counterpart might help to explain lower first-mover sending in the internet- 
based treatment of Chesney et al. (2009) as compared with their virtual world treatment in which subjects 
could visually verify the presence of one anothers’ avatars in the virtual lab room.  Conversely, evidence 
that the counterpart exists may be one factor explaining the greater trusting and trustworthiness in trust 
games with pre-play communication (Ben-Ner, Putterman and Ren, 2007).  
  4impact among the verbal treatments, the trust-encouraging cue is the more effective of the 
visual ones).   The amounts returned by second-movers are significantly correlated with 
the amounts they are sent but unaffected by treatment cues.   
Since broadening the subject pool beyond university students is one of our 
interests, we also investigate the possible dependence of behaviors on demographic 
variables.  We find that while age, student status, and income affect behaviors, those 
effects are not consistent with the suggestion that older, employed, or higher-earning 
individuals’ behaviors should conform with the predictions of standard economic theory 
better than the behaviors of students do.  On the contrary, our older, higher-earning, non-
student subjects tend to be significantly more trusting and trustworthy than their younger, 
lower-earning and student counterparts.
4  We also explore the possibility that individuals 
having different demographic characteristics might respond differently to given treatment 
variables, finding this to be for the most part untrue, but with interesting exceptions for 
gender and age range splits.  And we confirm Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and 
Soutter’s (2000) finding that self-reported belief that people can be trusted predicts own 
trustworthiness but not trusting.   
While ours is among the first generation of economics experiments in virtual 
worlds, a few others are also beginning to appear.  Chesney, Chuah and Hoffmann (2007) 
report play of a number of familiar games including the dictator game, the ultimatum 
game, and the public goods game, and find subject behaviors closely resembling those in 
conventional labs.   The subjects in Fiedler and Haruvy (forthcoming), Fiedler (2009) and 
Fiedler, Haruvy and Li (2008) play trust games following in-world communication with 
prospective partners, and the latter paper includes a control treatment without 
communication.
5  The subjects in the VE condition in Chesney, Chuah and Hoffman 
(2009) play a version of the trust game in Second Life in sessions in which the avatars of 
potential counterparts sit in a large virtual lab room separated by modest partitions.  In 
contrast with the latter papers, our experiment follows BDM in having complete 
anonymity and isolation of first and second movers.  And ours is (to our knowledge) the 
                                                 
4  To be sure, the additional trusting can be justified ex post as being fully rational and self-interested, given 
that second-mover behaviors render trusting profitable in our data, but the same cannot be said of second-
movers’ greater trustworthiness.  
5  Castronova et al. (2008) study how demand for a virtual product varies with its price but do not engage 
subjects in a laboratory-style decision-making experiment. 
  5first instance of a persistent economic experiment in a virtual world that automates 
recruitment, instruction, measurement and compensation, eliminating any direct 
interaction with the experimenter.  Finally, our experiment uses payoffs scaled closer to 
earnings from in-world jobs than to payoffs in most laboratory experiments.  Despite this, 
the large majority of our subjects report that the prospect of earning money was an 




Virtual worlds are persistent, online communities in which individuals interact 
with the synthetic environment and each other through avatars embodying their virtual 
selves.  These highly customizable spaces are tailored to service shared objectives 
requiring a high degree of interactivity between geographically dispersed individuals.  
Some worlds are tailored to servicing institutional objectives.  Educators use virtual 
worlds for distance learning and immersive simulation.  Business users have utilized 
virtual worlds for personnel recruitment, trade conferences, to collaborate across 
distances and to expand brand awareness.  Virtual worlds have enabled chronically or 
temporarily disabled individuals to overcome obstacles to socialization.  Recreational 
virtual world users play socially interactive games and co-create shared realities, finding 
simulated experiences to be more engaging and satisfying than other sedentary hobbies.   
For our experiment, we chose the world Second Life due to its combination of a 
potential subject pool conservatively estimated in the hundreds of thousands,
6 control 
afforded with respect to the configuration and appearance of the local virtual 
environment, relatively realistic and non-violent ambiance, and the possibility of legally 
purchasing virtual currency with which to pay subjects “in world.” The experiment was 
conducted in a second generation version of a virtual experimental laboratory that was 
constructed under our direction on Second Life’s Etopia Island, incorporating 
improvements over the version used in Atlas (2008a).   
                                                 
6  Approximately 1.45 million “residents” logged in to Second Life between October 25 and December 24, 
2008. A resident is defined by Linden Lab as a unique avatar, and it is noted that users may possess more 
than one avatar, rendering the unique user count lower.  At the time of the experiment, an average of 
48,000 users were in-world at any given moment.   
  6Most subjects learned of the experiment opportunity by reading a classified ad in 
Second Life and choosing to “teleport” to the lab entrance.
7  Upon entering, they found 
their avatar in a lobby where it encountered an automated, human-appearing greeter 
seated at a desk, who (when the subject clicked as instructed by a sign) invited their 
avatar to step onto another “teleporter” from which they emerged into one of six lab 
rooms each of which contained a single chair, an initial instruction sign, and in some 
treatments a framed photograph hanging on the wall.  Detailed instructions appeared in a 
“blue box” on the upper right of the subject’s screen.  Only one subject at a time was sent 
to a given lab room, and no local communication with other players was permitted.
8  The 
same avatar could not participate twice, and a variable lag in timing between first-mover 
and second-mover participation (for any given pair) assured that subjects could not 
arrange to play with either themselves (under an alternate avatar) or a friend.
9  
The experiment followed closely the structure of the trust or investment game 
introduced in BDM, where two subjects who remain anonymous to one another are each 
given an endowment of ten one dollar bills.  The first-mover in that design, whom we’ll 
call A, has to chose an integer amount XA   (0, 1, …, 10) to send to the second-mover, 
B.  As known in advance by both subjects, exactly three times the amount of money sent 
by A is delivered by the experimenter to B.  B may then send to A any or no part of this 
tripled amount, i.e. 0 ≤ XB ≤ 3XA (again, confined to integer values), which is not subject 
to further multiplication.  Thus, an amount that can vary between $20 and $40 (the total 
being determined solely by A’s choice) is to be divided between A and B in a manner 
determined partly (if 0 < XA < $10) or entirely (if XA = $10) by B.  Equilibrium play 
assuming common knowledge of rationality and self-interested preferences is that A 
                                                 
7 According to their responses to questions asked after the decision task, 67% of subjects learned about the 
experiment by reading the ad, 15% by word of mouth, and 18% by virtue of their avatar happening to pass 
by the lab building, over the door of which was a sign reading “Experimental Economics Lab; Participate 
in a 15-Minute Study; Earn L$100 – 400.”   
8 We checked for local communication subsequently and were prepared to drop observations in which the 
requirement was violated, but found no relevant instances. 
9 Two individuals could try to be matched with one another, but there were very low odds that they would 
succeed, and (equally important) no way they could obtain confirmation that they had done so, even if they 
were separately in contact by phone, e-mail, or other means.  See relevant wording of instructions, in the 
Appendix.  More details on construction of the experiment lab, choice of Etopia island, and criticisms 
received on the initial design are found in Atlas (2008b) and discussed in Bloomfield and Rennekamp 
(2009), while improvements made are discussed in the Appendix, which also includes wording of the 
advertisement and script of the greeter’s message.   
  7sends nothing since B will return nothing.  In BDM and subsequent replications, 
however, the large majority of first-movers are found to send positive amounts, and a 
majority of second-movers receiving money also return some, with average outcomes 
having B’s earning unambiguously more and A’s either more or less than in the predicted 
equilibrium, depending upon the trial. 
  In our neutral or BASELINE treatment, we replicated BDM’s procedure except 
for those logistical details and instructions specific to the handling of physical currency 
and the protection of double-blind anonymity through passing of marked envelopes, 
assignment of room monitors, use of mailboxes, etc.
10  With these exceptions, procedures 
were explained to subjects in as nearly as possible the same terms as used by BDM, and 
each knew the full instructions given to subjects in both roles before being informed of 
the role that he or she would be assigned to.
11  We substituted endowments of L$100, 
where L$ stands for Second Life “Linden” dollar, for the BDM endowments of (U.S.) 
$10, and we allowed subjects to send and return L$ integer amounts.
12  While at the time 
the experiments were conducted, L$100 could be purchased for considerably less than 
$10, our average subject earned more in twenty minutes of our experiment than in an 
hour of their Second Life employment, and 93% of subjects strongly agreed or agreed 
that the range of possible earnings from the experiment was reasonable.
13   
                                                 
10 Note that in our design, saying that ‘A sends money to B’ or ‘B sends money back to A’ is technically 
accurate only in the sense of money credited towards later payment, which takes place at the end of the 
experiment (an electronic payment in Second Life taking place within minutes of B’s decision).  One 
cannot rule out that both amounts sent and amounts sent back in BDM were influenced by the fact that the 
subjects in question were parting with physical dollar bills that they were free to instead place in their own 
pockets.  However, many other experiments using the basic BDM design have been conducted by computer 
or with passing only of decision sheets, with money payment at the end of the session, as is the rule in 
economics experiments.  No clear difference in behaviors is apparent in the trust game experiments 
conducted with physical bills and those with payment at the end of the interaction. 
11 Unlike our experiment and BDM, Chesney et al. (2009) paid their subjects show-up fees separate from 
the game payoffs and did not match the initial L$1000 given to A with any such grant to B.  Unlike our 
experiment and BDM, in Fiedler and Haruvy (forthcoming) and Fiedler et al. (2008) B players could send 
their counterparts not only any portion of their tripled receipts but also their initial endowment (which as in 
BDM and our experiment, is the same as the endowment of A players). 
12 Having choices be over the integers (as in BDM) rather than in increments of ten seemed more natural to 
us.  That it causes the action space to be more finely partitioned, with 101 rather than the 11 choices 
available to first-movers as in BDM, is a by-product of this decision that we don’t consider to be of 
particular importance.  
13  At the time of our experiment, 100 Linden dollars could be purchased from the LindeX™, the official 
Linden dollar exchange, at a cost of $0.38.  The typical subject devoted less than twenty minutes to our 
experiment, compared to 60 to 90 minutes for subjects in BDM.  55% of our subjects report holding a job 
in Second Life, with hourly wage rates averaging L$172.77 an hour (USD$0.65 per hour), approximately 
  8We randomly assigned subjects, who had no knowledge that multiple treatments 
existed,
14  to either our BASELINE treatment or to one of six others.  The other 
treatments differed from BASELINE either by the presence of one of two photographs on 
the virtual laboratory wall, by the addition of a pair of sentences to the end of the 
instructions, or both.   
Evolutionary psychologists argue that human sociality is governed by innate 
predispositions that are responsive to environmental triggers.
15  A dramatic recent 
example is reported by Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006), who show that honor system 
payments for coffee, tea and milk were almost three times higher when a narrow strip 
showing a photograph of human eyes directed at the user was included on the price list 
above the payment box in a psychology department’s coffee room as when the same strip 
contained photographs of flowers, even though no user reported noticing the pictures.  
Because a large proportion of subject behaviors in trust games depart from the prediction 
based on strict rationality and self-interest, it seemed likely to us that decisions to trust or 
be trustworthy might be sensitive to similar cues.  Also, ease of manipulation of visual 
fields may be a particular advantage of virtual world experiments.
16 We looked for 
contrasting photographs that might, on the one hand, promote an optimistic social 
                                                                                                                                                 
one twentieth of the same individuals’ average self-reported wage in real world employment.  Residents 
use the currency to purchase items such as virtual clothing and accessories, to pay rent on stores and virtual 
apartments, and to buy services from other players.  Examples of in-world prices include outfits sold for 
L$100, hair styles for L$100 to L$200, and weekly rents on shop spaces and houses in a similar range.  
While the range of earnings possible in the roughly contemporaneous experiments of Chesney et al. and 
Fiedler and co-authors were far higher, we believe that with about a million “residents” in Second Life, few 
if any of our subjects knew of their roughly contemporaneous experiments, which we ourselves were not 
aware of. 
14 A possible exception would be subjects who happened to encounter previous subjects either on their way 
out of the lab or subsequently, and who furthermore discussed relevant details of the experiment with them.  
Since only 15% of subjects reported learning of the experiment by word-of-mouth, and since very detailed 
discussions and recollection seem unlikely, we think it safe to assume that few if any subjects were aware 
of treatment differences.  
15 An overview is provided in Buss (2008), a clear popular treatment in Wright (1994).  For a discussion 
from the standpoint of economics, see Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1998).  Social scientists taking a more 
“co-evolutionary” view, for example Boyd and Richerson (1985), give more equal emphasis to social and 
cultural evolution, with the environment shaping the behavioral expression of genetic predispositions over 
time, but such views also allow for innate social predispositions (see Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998). 
16 One could vary what pictures hang on the wall of a brick-and-mortar lab room also.  However, the virtual 
environment makes it easier to experiment with different placements, sizes, and lighting, to rule out the 
possibility of prospective subjects noticing changes being made, and to assign subjects to rooms having one 
or another photo or none with no possibility of seeing the other rooms (thanks to travel by “teleportation”).  
More importantly, perhaps, the specific visual manipulations we tried only scratch the surface of what is 
possible in this medium, so that our treatments might be compared to taking a new vehicle for a quite 
modest test drive.    
  9outlook, and on the other, a more cautious and self-interested (or self-protective) 
approach.  The upper portion of Figure 2 shows the photos selected for what we’ll call 
the OPTIMISTIC and CAUTIONARY treatments, respectively, while the lower portions 
show experiment rooms as viewed by a subject under the respective treatment (in non-
photo treatments including BASELINE, the room was identical but for the absence of 
both picture and frame).  
Although manipulation of instruction text can as easily be done in a physical as in 
a virtual lab, we were interested in comparing the impact of words to that of pictures 
holding all other design elements constant.  We chose textual passages with the parallel 
aim of encouraging either optimistically social or cautious and self-interested play, 
calling the treatments in question COOPERATIVE and COMPETITIVE.  The wordings 
are:  
 
[COOPERATIVE treatment] By working together and acting fairly, both participants can 
double their money.  (The first decision-maker can send L$100, the second decision-
maker can return L$200, and they therefore each earn L$200 instead of each earning 
100). 
 
[COMPETITIVE treatment] However, assuming that second person wants to earn as 
much as possible, he/she will send none of the money received back to the first person.  
So if the first person sends L$100 and the second person keeps the largest amount of 
money, he/she will earn L$400 and the first person will earn zero. 
 
The full instructions are shown in the Appendix.   
 
We expected at the outset that our visual and textual manipulations would work 
through different pathways, the former being automatic and unconscious, the latter 
infusing the contents of deliberative thought.
17  Their effects might have differences of 
                                                 
17 The distinction between conscious and automatic mental processes is discussed by Bargh and Chartrand 
(1999).  Burnham, McCabe and Smith’s (2000) example of trust games using alternatively the terms 
“partner” versus “opponent” and Ross and Ward’s (1996) example of subjects recruited to play prisoners’ 
dilemma games described alternatively as “the Wall Street Game” and “the Community Game” provide 
  10quality or degree, and would not necessarily be additive.
18  Nevertheless, to check 
whether the visual and textual cues had reinforcing effects, we also implemented a 
COOP-OPTIMISTIC treatment in which subjects were exposed simultaneously to the 
OPTIMISTIC visual cue and the COOPERATIVE textual cue, and a counterpart COMP-
CAUTIONARY treatment.  
 We attempted to collect twenty-five valid observations of paired first- and 
second-movers interacting in each of the seven treatments, although numbers exceeded 
this target in one case due to an initial difficulty in the randomizing of treatment 
assignments.
19  We then analyzed behaviors using both the full samples of observations 
and samples from which we eliminated observations potentially attributable to the same 
individual playing under two identities, as indicated by a common IP address.
20   
 
Results: first-mover sending 
                                                                                                                                                 
illustrations of how changing the description of a decision task can alter subject behaviors.  Our added text 
treatments bear some resemblance to these manipulations but represent attempts to introduce more 
conscious lines of thought in subjects’ minds.  In addition to the example by Bateson, Nettle and Roberts 
(2006), described in the text, other examples of priming by photograph and film, respectively, are found in 
Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik and Wilson (2001) and Kirschsteiger, Rigotti and Rustichini (2006).  On the 
psychology of priming, see Klauer (1997).  Page and Putterman (2010) contrast a trust game described to 
subjects using the standard terms including “send” and “send back,” as initiated by BDM, and a formally 
equivalent game presented in entirely spatial terms without mention of such terms. 
18 Note also that we would not want to generalize from findings from our specific textual treatments, with 
their explicit discussion of the strategy of play, to a larger universe of text-adding treatments, which could 
use suggestive terminology, employ words to achieve more subliminal priming effects, or embody still 
other approaches. 
19 Subjects were initially assigned to a treatment through an in-world randomization script.  However, the 
randomization caused some treatments to be favored slightly. Accordingly, we switched to having 
treatments be assigned by rotation, to more easily attain roughly equal numbers.  Small differences in 
completion rates and in numbers of duplicate IP subjects account for remaining differences in numbers of 
valid observations. 
20 We attempted to minimize the possibility of individuals participating multiple times first by simply 
telling subjects that this was not acceptable as “the same person repeating the experiment compromises the 
integrity of the study,” secondly by making sure a given avatar does not play twice, and third by instituting 
a procedure to capture IP addresses.  We think few people would go to the trouble of changing avatars and 
IP addresses in order to participate twice in a study with rather modest returns.  Two observations sharing 
the same IP address could indicate that the same person is playing twice, perhaps using different avatars, or 
that roommates or members of the same family played the game, conceivably sharing information (for 
instance, comparing one another’s treatment cues).  In our restricted samples, we eliminate all of the 
observations for which the IP address is not unique, not merely the later-occurring observations from a 
given address. 14.6% of observations are associated with a non-unique address, with the proportion of such 
dropped observations ranging from 2% (in the CAUTIONARY treatment) to 26 % (in the COMPETITIVE 
treatment).  On the trade-off between more detailed verification procedures and privacy and brevity, see 
also our discussion in footnote 30. 
  11Table 1a shows the average amount sent by subjects in the A role by treatment.  It 
reports the non-duplicate-IP observations, the full sample averages being similar. 
Considering first behaviors in the BASELINE treatment and average behaviors in the 
experiment as a whole, we note that the proportion of endowment sent by BASELINE 
treatment subjects lies only slightly below the average proportion sent in all treatments 
combined, 51.8%, and that this is remarkably similar to the proportion sent by BDM’s 
subjects, 51.6%.  It likewise resembles the amounts sent in other one-shot trust game 
experiments having the same payoff structure, such as Carter and Castillo (2002) 
(53.0%), Schechter (2007) (46.8%), and Danielson and Holm (2005) (52.2%), as well as 
the proportion of a L$1000 endowment sent by Fiedler et al.’s control treatment subjects 
(53.4%).
21  There is no indication here that smaller stakes, a more diverse subject pool, or 
a virtual environment alter average first-mover behavior in our experiment.  
Turning to differences among treatments, Table 1a shows averages ranging from a 
low of 33.1% of the endowment in the COMPETITIVE textual cue treatment to a high of 
70.4% of endowment in the OPTIMISTIC visual cue treatment.  Average sending in the 
BASELINE treatment, with neither visual nor textual cues added, lies near the middle of 
this range, at 49.3%, with averages of the other treatments each falling above or below 
the BASELINE average in the directions expected.  The difference in sending between 
the OPTIMISTIC and CAUTIONARY visual treatments and those between the 
COOPERATIVE and COMPETITIVE textual treatments are large: a spread of L$21.54 
(21.5% of endowment) between the two visual treatments and a difference of L$26.01 
(26.0% of endowment) between the two textual treatments, both differences being 
                                                 
21 We focus on the most similar comparison treatments, ignoring variants in which the second-mover is 
given no endowment or is permitted to return both the endowment and money received from the first-
mover, variants in which the sent amount is doubled rather than tripled, ones with multiple interactions, 
binary versions of the game, etc.  We consider Haruvy, Fiedler and Li’s Control 3 treatment in which there 
was no pre-play communication, avatars were seated in different virtual rooms, and amounts sent by first-
movers were tripled.  Chesney et al. (2009)’s virtual world treatment first-movers sent a relatively high 
61.2% of their endowments.  This more trusting behavior might be attributable to the fact that six to eight 
subjects’ avatars played simultaneously in the same room, so that the avatars of one’s potential counterparts 
were “socially present,” an intentional design element driven by their goal of comparing virtual world 
interactions to the less personal interactions characteristic of electronic commerce.  Recalling that their 
second-movers did not receive the L$1000 endowment that the experimenters gave to their first-movers 
(although both received L$500 show-up fees), it is worth noting that some sending may have been 
motivated by fairness rather than trust (see Cox, 2004). 
  12significant at the 5% level in two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests.
22  The combinations of 
textual and visual cues fail to be mutually reinforcing in their effects, with the difference 
between COOP-OPTIMISTIC and COMP-CAUTIONARY sending averages being only 
L$8.00 (8.0% of endowment) and not statistically significant.  Each average nevertheless 
lies on the side of the BASELINE treatment’s average on which the combined treatment 
would be expected to place it provided that combining treatments doesn’t completely 
negate their individual effects. 
When a Tobit regression is estimated for all observations with first-mover sending 
as dependent variable, treatment dummies as explanatory variables, and BASELINE as 
omitted category, only the OPTIMISTIC treatment dummy is statistically significant at 
the 5% level (see column 1 of Table 2).  However, F-tests indicate that a number of the 
coefficients differ significantly from each other.  In particular, differences between the 
coefficients for the main paired comparator treatments are significant: those of the 
COOPERATIVE and COMPETITIVE (textual) treatments differ at the 1% level, those of 
the OPTIMISTIC and CAUTIONARY (visual) treatments at the 5% level.  The 
COMPETITIVE and OPTIMISTIC coefficients differ from each other at the 1% level of 
significance, as do the OPTIMISTIC and COMP-CAUTIONARY coefficients.  The 
COMPETITIVE and COOP-OPTIMISTIC coefficients differ at the 5% level, and the 
COMPETITIVE and CAUTIONARY coefficients differ at the 10% level.
23 
The effects of the two visual and the two textual treatment pairs differ in their 
“centering.”  Relative to BASELINE, the OPTIMISTIC visual cue induces a dramatic 
upward shift in average sending whereas the CAUTIONARY visual cue induces only a 
statistically insignificant and economically small decline.  Relative to BASELINE, the 
COOPERATIVE textual cue induces a smaller (although in this case more economically 
meaningful) increase in sending than the decrease induced by the COMPETITIVE cue.  
                                                 
22 Appendix Table A.1 provides a summary of Mann-Whitney test results for differences among all 
treatments both in amounts sent by first-movers and proportions returned by second-movers. 
23 Another way of observing these differences is to use a treatment pair member as the base.  For example, 
when only the observations of the COOPERATIVE and COMPETITIVE treatments are included in a 
regression to predict first-mover sending, a dummy variable for COOPERATIVE treatment obtains a large 
positive coefficient (42.08) with p = .014.  A parallel exercise using only the OPTIMISTIC and 
CAUTIONARY treatment observations yields a large positive coefficient (38.03) on the OPTIMISTIC 
treatment dummy with p = .031. 
 
  13Looking at the comparatively weaker effects of the combined text-and-visual treatments, 
a larger sending difference relative to BASELINE is induced by COOP-OPTIMISTIC 
than by COMP-CAUTIONARY.
24  A possible explanation might be that a textual 
intervention has more power to move sending down than up because spelling out the 
logic of Nash equilibrium play between perfectly self-interested actors constitutes a 
bigger departure from many subjects’ initial outlooks than does spelling out the appeal of 
cooperation.  (That only a small minority send nothing in most trust game experiments 
suggests that the tendency to trust or to anticipate reciprocity is “natural” to most 
subjects, whereas the logic of sub-game perfect equilibrium play is not.)  With respect to 
the visual cues, the photo of two cuddly pandas may have a more unambiguous power to 
imbue subjects with good feelings than the fish photo has to do the opposite because the 
social inclinations that lead to trusting in the BASELINE treatment are more readily 
reinforced through this emotive channel, whereas the caution subjects bring to their 
decisions is more susceptible to rational argument than to emotional reinforcement.  
Whatever the explanation for the asymmetry, it is worth noting that the COMPETITIVE 
and OPTIMISTIC treatments yielded differences in average first-mover sending of a 
magnitude such that sending in the latter averaged more than twice that in the former. 
 
Decisions by second-movers 
Column 5 of Table 1b shows, by treatment, the average proportion returned by 
subjects in the B role who received a nonzero amount from their counterpart in the A role 
(the only B’s having a decision to make).  The overall average works out to 47.3% of the 
tripled amount, with BASELINE treatment subjects returning an average of 50.7% of the 
amount received from their counterparts.  These proportions are considerably higher than 
the 33.3% that causes the first-mover to break even, higher than the 29.8% average 
proportion returned by BDM’s subjects, and above most other results in the literature, 
including BDM’s “social history” treatment (37.1%) and Danielson and Holm’s (2005) 
average over Tanzanian and Swedish subject pools (35.8%).  The difference with our 
                                                 
24 Non-parametric tests for differences with BASELINE sending yield results similar to those of the Tobit 
regression (Table 2, col. 1).  In two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests, only sending in the OPTIMISTIC treatment 
is statistically different from that in BASELINE, in this case at the 10% level.  The sending difference 
between COMPETITIVE and BASELINE falls a bit short of this level and achieves significance only in a 
one-tailed test.  No other differences from BASELINE are statistically significant. 
  14subjects’ 47.4% average return proportion is smaller, however, in some studies: Burks, 
Carpenter and Verhoogen’s (2003) base treatment (40.0%), the result in Schechter (2007) 
(43.7%), and the proportion returned by second-mover recipients of positive amounts in 
Fiedler et al.’s Control 3 treatment (41.7%), all showing that returns above the break-
even level are not so uncommon.
25  The greater degree of reciprocity evinced by our 
subjects might be partly attributable to lower real-money stakes, but it is still remarkable 
in view of the importance subjects report that they attached to earning Lindens as a 
motivator of their participation, and especially given the unusually high degree of 
anonymity both among players and between players and experimenters.  Moreover, it 
runs dramatically counter to the seemingly sensible intuition of at least one respected 
experimental economist that “[i]n the virtual world … you’re virtually free of … 
reputational concerns, so you might get people acting in a more self-interested way.”
26  
Along with Chesney et al.’s average return rate of 38.5% of received amount in their 
virtual world treatment, but still more so in view of the greater anonymity of our design, 
our subjects’ behaviors suggest that human sociality runs quite deep, being brought along 
by most subjects even as they manipulate cartoonish self-representations in a make-
believe world.
27 
 Looking at the individual treatments and again restricting attention to cases in 
which second-movers had received positive amounts, OPTIMISTIC, COMP-
CAUTIONARY, and COOP-OPTIMISTIC second-movers returned on average between 
44 and 49% of the tripled amounts received by them, while CAUTIONARY and 
COMPETITIVE treatment subjects returned 42 and 39%, respectively, and 
COOPERATIVE treatment subjects were the only ones returning more than BASELINE 
counterparts, an average of 57%.  Only two treatment differences in percentage returned 
are statistically significant in two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests: subjects in the 
COOPERATIVE verbal treatment returned more than those in both the COMPETITIVE 
verbal treatment and the CAUTIONARY visual treatment, significant at the 10% level.  
                                                 
25 Second-movers return an average of 42.5% of the tripled amount in the no communication treatment in 
Ben-Ner, Putterman and Ren (2007), a result not included in the main comparison because subjects 
engaged in several interactions (each with a different partner).  
26 John List, quoted in Foster (2007). 
27 A similar interpretation might also be given to the considerable indications of reciprocity or fairness on 
the parts of participants in the uninterpreted spatial treatment of Page and Putterman (2010). 
  15The ordering of compared percentages returned is consistent with expectations of which 
verbal and visual treatments would tend to elicit more cooperative and which more 
competitive behaviors both in the cases just mentioned and in those in which the 
differences lack statistical significance, with the exception that the proportion returned is 
slightly higher in the COMP-CAUTIONARY than in the COOP-OPTIMISTIC treatment.   
  These raw comparisons of proportion returned by second-movers are of more 
limited value than the comparisons of first-mover sending that preceded them because the 
proportion of tripled funds that second-movers return could be influenced by the amount 
received.  Some studies, for instance Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009), find that the amount 
sent by the first-mover is a significant positive predictor of the proportion returned by the 
second-mover (“trustworthiness” rises with “trusting”), while others, including Cox 
(2004) and Brülhart and Usunier (2004) find negative relationships.  For our data, Tobit 
regressions in which the proportion returned by B is the dependent variable and the 
amount sent by A and treatment dummy variables are the explanatory variables, fail to 
show a significant effect of A’s sending on the proportion returned (see Table 3, column 
1).
28  Nevertheless, controlling for amount sent alters conclusions about treatment effects 
on proportion return.  Specifically, with this control included and with BASELINE 
treatment as default, none of the treatment dummies obtains a significant coefficient (see 
Table 3).  Including interaction terms between amount received and treatments doesn’t 
change this outcome.  Nor do any of the estimated treatment dummies differ significantly 
from each other according to F-tests.  We conclude that while treatment differences 
significantly affect the choices of first-movers, they do not significantly affect those of 
second-movers once the behaviors of their first-mover counterparts are controlled for. 
  Note that failure to find a significant association between first-mover sending and 
second-mover return proportion does not mean that there is no correlation between 
sending and returning.  A Tobit regression of amount (rather than proportion) returned by 
second-movers on amount sent by first-movers, with 142 observations, obtains a 
coefficient of 1.60 on the explanatory variable, with t-statistic 9.96.  The numerical 
                                                 
28 Only observations for those B’s who received positive amounts are included in our regression.  While 
Fiedler et al. (2008) report a regression in which proportion returned is significantly positively correlated 
with amount sent, this is likely to be influenced by the inclusion of observations in which the first-mover 
sent zero. 
  16average return on Linden dollars sent by first-movers, according to Table 1b, is 142% (≈  
.473/.333), which falls short of the proportion needed to equalize the final earnings of B 
and A but nevertheless represents a full 42% return on trusting for first-movers.  Thus a 
first-mover with perfect foresight regarding the distribution of second-mover responses, 




Subject characteristics, source of local currency, and their effects 
  A major goal of our experiment was to include older, non-student, and employed 
individuals in our sample at modest cost in terms of subject payments and logistics.  But 
before we discuss our subjects’ demographic characteristics to assess our success in this 
respect, we need to note that apart from IP addresses, our knowledge of subject 
demographics depends on information subjects provided in response to our post-decision 
demographic questions.  We have no way of ruling out that any given response might be 
fictitious, so those of our findings that depend on this portion of our data must be treated 
with caution.  Since we provided strong assurances of privacy, a credible link to an 
institution of higher education, reference to its standards of research ethics, and no 
incentive for falsification, we think it reasonable to assume at least a loose relationship 
between subjects’ answers and their actual information and beliefs.  Without minimizing 
the problems in question, we shall proceed accordingly.
30 
Of our subjects who completed the experiment from unique IP addresses, only 
12% (by self-report) are full-time students age 22 or below, the majority of these being 
                                                 
29 To further confirm this, we estimated an OLS regression, with first-mover earnings as dependent 
variable, the independent variables being first-mover sending and its square, treatment dummies, treatment 
dummies interacted with first-mover sending, and treatment dummies interacted with the square of first-
mover sending.  Whereas the coefficients on first-mover sending and its square are both positive and jointly 
significant (the coefficient values are 0.401 and 0.006, respectively), no corresponding pair of interacted 
terms (for example, COOP*send and COOP*send
2) is jointly significant.  Results are shown in Appendix 
Table A.2. 
30 Ways of verifying subjects’ identities through a background check can be devised, but since these are 
time-consuming, they would discourage participation without offsetting compensation.  Also, because it 
would be difficult to verify characteristics like age and gender without the risk of revealing personal 
identity, such verification would also conflict with anonymity, which is a central element of the trust game 
design (since the experimenter does not want subjects “acting nice” for the sake of reputation).  Note that 
the survey questions, which are shown in the Appendix, distinguish clearly between questions about the 
characteristics of the subjects’ “in world” identities, i.e. their avatars, and questions about their “first life” 
identities or real world selves. We compare our subjects’ self-reported demographics with those of Second 
Life residents in general in footnote 32.      
  17American.  29.5% of subjects report real ages of 23 – 30 years, 24.6% 31 – 40, 12.6% 41 
– 50, and 6.5% 51 or older.  15% of subjects report having a post-college degree, 30% 
being college graduates, and another 46% high school graduates.  17% report being full-
time students, 45% report being in full-time employment, 20.7% part-time students 
and/or in part-time employment, and 17% report being unemployed and not in school.   
In terms of real-world incomes, employed subjects reported a median hourly wage 
of $12-$15 an hour for real-world employment, with 20% earning under $5.85 an hour 
and 29% more than $20 an hour.
31  Assuming a modicum of accuracy in these responses, 
this suggests that a considerable fraction of the subject pool could have been induced to 
report to a brick-and-mortar experiment lab only with a considerable cash outlay by the 
experimenter.  54% reported their real-world gender to be female, with 90% reporting 
that their avatar’s and real-world gender were the same.  About 59% of subjects had US-
based IP addresses, 33% addresses in Europe, Canada or Australia, 4% addresses in 
Asian countries, and 3% ones in Latin America, with the remaining 1% from other 
countries or unidentified locations.
32   
To help us understand subjects’ valuation of Linden dollars for purposes of 
assessing the possibility that experimenters might leverage the purchasing power of their 
subject payment dollars by paying with “in world” currency, our post-task survey 
questions asked subjects about their sources of L$’s.  55% of subjects reported being 
employed for L$’s in Second Life, with 93% of the latter earning 0 to L$500 per hour in 
such employment, 5% L$501 to L$2,000 an hour, and 2% over L$2,001 an hour.  Of 
those employed in Second Life, 48% reported doing less than 5 hours of such paid work 
                                                 
31 Of the remainder, 10% reported earnings between $5.85 and $8, 17% between $8 and $12, 11% between 
$12 and $15, and 12% $15 to $20.  Of those earning more than $20 an hour, 18% reported earning $20 to 
$40 an hour, and 11% over $40/hr. 
32 One way to roughly check the accuracy of our subjects’ responses is to compare their self-reported 
demographics to those reported independently for Second Life residents as a whole.  Relying on various 
sources, including Linden Labs, Borst, 2009, reports a distribution of hours spent in Second Life by country 
of residence as 39.4% for the United States, 41.9% for Europe, Canada or Australia, and 5.5% for Japan.  
The greater bias of our sample toward the U.S. may partly be explained by the language factor (Borst 
reports that some 34% of SL residents had language settings of continental European languages, while 3% 
had language settings of Japanese).  The age distribution reported uses different ranges than those in our 
survey but shows a strong resemblance to our numbers: less than 1% ages 13 – 17, 15.1% ages 18 – 24, 
34.5% ages 25 – 34, 28.5% ages 35 – 44, and 21.1% age 45 and over.  The reported gender breakdown is 
somewhat heavier on males than our sample’s self-reports (58.7% male, 41.3% female) but the difference 
is not dramatic.  Overall, these and other independent reports of demographics appear similar enough to 
those obtained by us, especially if we keep in mind that our participants were self-selected out of the 
broader SL population. 
  18per week, 36% 6 to 20 hours, and 16% 21 hours or more per week.  27% said they had 
purchased L$’s for a real-world currency during the previous month.  For the regression 
exercises to which we turn next, we use the responses on hours worked and currency 
purchased to create an indicator we call “in world money” which equals one for subjects 
who reported having a job in Second Life and not purchasing Lindens with real world 
currency during the previous month.  40% of participants (41% of the first movers and 
39% of the second movers) meet this criterion. 
Does it matter whether a subject is a student or an older, perhaps employed, 
individual?  We begin to explore the influence of student or non-student status,
33 age, 
gender, real-world earnings, and source of L$’s upon decisions in the experiment by 
including these factors as explanatory variables, along with treatment dummies, in Tobit 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the amount of endowment sent by a first-
mover (Table 2) or the proportion of the amount received that is returned by a second-
mover (Table 3).  The second-mover regressions include only subjects who received 
positive amounts, and the amount received is included as an additional control.  When 
only a single personal characteristic is entered alongside the treatment dummies, self-
reported gender has no effect, while student status attains a highly significant and 
economically large negative coefficient for both first-mover sending and second-mover 
fraction returned, implying that students were significantly less trusting and trustworthy 
(less generous) in their decisions.  Perhaps for parallel reasons, chronological age obtains 
positive coefficients in the two regressions in which it enters alone among the individual 
characteristics (although its coefficient falls short of significance in the regression for 
first-mover sending), and self-reported real-world income is also a significant positive 
predictor of amount sent and proportion returned.  Our indicator that the subject is likely 
to have obtained his or her virtual currency by working in Second Life rather than by 
purchase on the LindeX™ for U.S. dollars, “in-world money,” obtains a positive 
coefficient falling just short of the 10% significance level in Table 2 and a negative 
coefficient significant at the 10% level in Table 3, when entered singly.  When all five 
                                                 
33 For purposes of this exercise, the category “student” includes not only the 12% of subjects reporting their 
age to be 18-22 and their occupational status to be “full-time student” but also the 8% of subjects reporting 
their age to be 18 – 22 and their occupational status “part-time student and/or part-time work” as well as the 
1% of subjects who report in the post-decision survey an age below 18 despite declaring their age to be 18 
or above at the participant consent stage before the experiment began.  
  19individual-level variables are entered simultaneously, as shown in column (7) of each 
table, the coefficient on “in-world money” becomes significant and retains its opposite 
signs in both tables, while the student, age and income variables retain their signs in all 
but one case, with at least one of them (student, for the first-mover regression, age, for 
the second-mover one) being individually significant.   
In addition to studying the general effects of subject characteristics on their 
experimental trusting and trustworthiness, our data also allow us to investigate whether 
subjects having different demographic characteristics responded differently to our visual 
and textual treatments.  One approach is to include treatment-characteristic interaction 
terms (for example, Female*COOPERATIVE) in regressions like those of tables 2 and 3, 
but the number of potential interactions is large relative to the number of observations 
and no significant coefficients emerged in this exercise.  As an alternative, we split the 
sample according to each criterion (male versus female, student versus non-student, etc.), 
making the sub-groups about equally sized when possible,
34 and performed Chow tests of 
whether the relationships captured by the regressions specified in the last columns of 
each table can be treated as the same in each paired sub-population.  Three pairs of 
regressions were found to differ between sub-populations: the first-mover regression 
differs between male and female subjects (p = .0481); and both first-mover and second-
mover regressions differ between younger and older subjects (p = .0999 and p = .0288, 
respectively).  For these three cases, Table 4 reports the regressions by sub-group. 
Viewing the results, we find that even in these cases in which there are some 
differences between sub-populations, most of the main results hold for both sub-groups—
e.g., there are qualitatively similar differences in first-mover sending between 
COOPERATIVE and COMPETITIVE treatments and also between OPTIMISTIC and 
                                                 
34 For the age and income variables, we used the median observation as point of division and placed those 
at the median into whichever group (above, or below, median) would make the resulting sub-groups of 
more nearly equal size.  Accordingly, participants with the median age (26.5 for first and second movers) 
were included with the younger split, with 88 first-movers in the younger group, 68 first-movers in the 
older group,78 second-movers in the younger group and 64 second-movers in the older group.  The median 
income was $13.500, and this group was included with the lower earners for both first and second movers 
(n=71, and 74, respectively with 85 and 68 in the higher income group).  Among first-movers, there were 
82 males and 74 females, and 92 subjects who met the criterion for “in-world money” while 64 did not.  
Among second-movers, there were 55 males and 87 females, and 89 meeting the “in-world money” 
criterion versus 53 not doing so.  Only the student/ non-student split unavoidably yielded groups of highly 
unequal size: 32 students and 124 non-students among the first-movers, and 31 students and 111 non-
students among the second-movers who had received positive amounts.   
  20CAUTIONARY treatments in both the male and the female and in both the younger and 
older sub-populations.  The take-home message from this may be that it is not critical to 
reach beyond the typical subject pool of college-aged students, but we do not view this as 
a “no news” result since it is not something that could have been presumed without 
investigation.  There are, moreover, some differences between groups.   
The third column of each set shows the p-value of a test for differences in 
coefficients.  These test results indicate that female first-movers sent significantly more 
under the COOP-OPTIMISTIC treatment than did males.  Indeed, comparison of the 
treatment dummies for the COOPERATIVE, OPTIMSTIC and COOP-OPTIMISTIC 
treatments suggests that positive visual and textual stimuli had reinforcing effects on 
first-mover sending among female subjects, though that was not the case for male 
subjects nor for the sample as a whole.  The negative effect of student status on first-
mover sending is also significantly larger for female than for male subjects.  For first-
mover sending split by age, only the general effect of being female appears to differ 
significantly, being positive for older and negative for younger subjects—though this 
gender effect is not independently significant in the regression for either sub-population. 
With regard to the proportion returned by second-movers, the regressions for 
which differ only under the division by age group, there is a significant difference in the 
coefficient on the CAUTIONARY treatment, which is more negative for younger 
subjects, and on the general effect of income, which is significantly negative for the 
younger sub-group and positive but insignificant for the older subjects.  We also checked 
whether the differences between paired coefficients significantly differed between sub-
groups.  Focusing on the core treatment differences, those between the COOPERATIVE 
and COMPETITIVE treatments and those between the OPTIMISTIC and 
CAUTIONARY treatments, we found only one case of significant difference: the 
difference between the OPTIMISTIC and the CAUTIONARY treatment dummies is 
larger for younger than for older second-movers, significant at the 1% level, according to 
an F-test.  While only one of the individual treatment dummy variables concerned is itself 
statistically significant, and that one only marginally so, this test indicates that, relative to 
older second-movers, younger second-movers were moved towards (away from) 
  21reciprocity by the presence of the panda (fish) photo, while if anything the opposite was 
the case for older second-movers.
35   
 
Survey trust instruments and trust game decisions 
  A large empirical literature on trust and macroeconomic outcomes has grown up 
independently of the experimental trust game literature, and several scholars, including 
Glaeser et al. (2000) and Sapienza et al. (2007), have investigated how, if at all, 
experimental behaviors correlate with the survey responses.   In our post-task survey 
questions, we included the generalized trust question from the World Values Survey 
(“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?”) and we also asked our subjects whether, in their 
opinion, “Second Life residents [are] more trustworthy, less trustworthy, or about the 
same as people in the general population?”  While the responses are uncorrelated with 
first-mover choices, they are highly correlated with the proportion of received money 
returned by second-movers: subjects who selected the trusting response to the generalized 
trust question and subjects who rated Second Life residents as more trustworthy were 
themselves more trustworthy in their decisions, mirroring closely the finding of Glaeser 
et al. (2000) that the trust question predicts trustworthiness but not trust.
36  In contrast, 
answers to the question of whether Second Life residents are “more worthy of reciprocal 
                                                 
35 An F-test of the right-most regression in Table 4 shows that although the relevant coefficients are 
individually insignificant, the coefficients on the OPTIMISTIC and CAUTIONARY treatment dummies 
differ from each other at the 5% significance level for older subjects, with such subjects actually tending to 
return a higher proportion of the amount received under the CAUTIONARY than under the OPTIMISTIC 
treatment.  It’s worth bearing in mind that OPTIMISTIC treatment subjects had received considerably more 
from their first movers than had their CAUTIONARY treatment counterparts and that returning a smaller 
proportion does not imply returning a smaller amount.  Perhaps some older second movers were more 
disposed to reward sending that took place in a cool and discouraging environment than were their 
counterparts disposed to reward sending in a warm and cuddly one because the former perceived sending in 
the environment in question as a more impressive act of trust than did the latter.  
36 We estimated tobit regressions with either sending by A or proportion returned by B as dependent 
variable, with the independent variables being the responses to the generalized trust and other opinion 
questions entered either jointly or singly, plus treatment dummy variables.  In one set of regressions for 
second-mover behaviors, we included also the amount received from A.  The other opinion variables 
concern the trustworthiness of Second Life residents, and the deservingness of Second Life residents, in 
both cases relative to the general population.  In the proportion returned but not in the amount sent 
regressions, the first two opinion variables obtained statistically significant coefficients whether entered 
jointly or singly.  Results are shown in Appendix Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2.  We note that the responses to the 
opinion questions by second-movers are uncorrelated with the amounts they had received from their 
counterparts (already known to them when answering), so stated views on trust whether in general or 
among Second Life residents appear to be unaffected by the counterpart’s choice.  
  22treatment … than people in the general population?” were uncorrelated with either first- 
or second-movers’ behaviors. 
  
Discussion 
We investigated the potential to conduct economic experiments in a virtual world, 
Second Life, choosing as our example the trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995).  
One motivation was to consider the possibility that a more diverse subject pool could be 
recruited and engaged in an experiment with a high degree of anonymity and with 
effective incentives at reasonable cost to the experimenter.  While we forewent 
verification of subject characteristics for reasons of cost and privacy, it appears that we 
succeeded in obtaining a subject population that is considerably more diverse than that in 
the usual laboratory experiment in terms of age, occupation, and education.  According to 
our data, age and employment status do make a difference to subjects’ general behaviors, 
which confirms the desirability of a broad subject pool.  But the differences run contrary 
to suspicions that students are unrepresentatively naïve or unselfish.  Despite an 
unusually high degree of anonymity, most subjects did not adopt “asocial” patterns of 
behavior.  On the contrary, there was as much trusting as in lab and field trials of the 
same experiment, and somewhat more trustworthiness.  
We used convenient features of the virtual lab environment to investigate 
subjects’ sensitivities to contrasting visual and textual modifications of the trust game.  
While replicating previous findings that the overwhelming majority of first-movers send 
money to their counterparts, we found their decisions to be sensitive to small differences 
in instruction text or viewed environment.  The average amount sent by first-movers was 
almost identical to that in BDM, but at the treatment level it differed by about a quarter of 
the endowment (or about half of the average amount sent) as between two visual cue 
treatments selected to encourage an optimistic social outlook or a cautious self-interested 
outlook, respectively.  Average sending differed by a similar amount between two add-on 
text treatments, one suggesting possibilities of cooperation, the other spelling out the 
implications of individual payoff maximization.    
Second-movers were exposed to the same treatment differences as their first-
mover counterparts but the amounts they returned—which sufficed to make trusting pay 
  23off on average—varied significantly mainly as a function of amount received, not 
treatment.   Apparently, the norm of reciprocating the trust shown by a counterpart was 
much stronger than any impact of the verbal and visual cues distinguishing our 
treatments.  And while first-movers faced no stimulus to action other than the instructions 
and visual environments, small manipulations of which proved quite influential, second-
movers had the additional stimulus of an actual counterpart’s decision, which evidently 
was far more salient to them than were our changes in cues. 
In addition to the general findings just noted, we also found some differences in 
treatment effects between male and female and between younger and older subjects.  
Positive visual and textual stimuli were reinforcing when combined for female but not 
male first-movers. Positive and negative visual stimuli triggered different effects on the 
proportion returned by younger than by older second movers  
Like Bateson et al. (2006), our visual treatment comparisons strongly support the 
idea, suggested by evolutionary psychology, that human social behaviors are responsive 
to environmental cues.  This finding fits well with the interpretation of trust game 
behaviors as being much influenced by social predispositions, and we interpret the 
replication of such behaviors even in our highly anonymous design in a virtual world 
setting as a further indication of those dispositions’ strength.  We found that verbal 
suggestions could have an equally large influence on behavior as did visual ones, but the 
two kinds of influence operated asymmetrically.  The fact that the visual cues were more 
successful at bolstering sociality while the verbal ones were better at quashing it suggests 
that different pathways are at work, with the visual cue best at strengthening partly 
unconscious social intuitions and the textual one best at activating conscious rationality to 
over-ride those intuitions.  Of course, our small sample and the specific nature of the 
visual and textual cues used in our experiment must be borne in mind, so any 
extrapolation from the conclusions just stated should be done with great caution.  
One issue likely to be of interest for future research is whether we were successful 
in providing meaningful economic incentives to our subjects despite the lower dollar 
value of the incentives provided. A common yardstick with which to measure the scale of 
payoffs is the comparison of subjects’ earnings to average wage rates in the environment 
from which they are drawn.  About half of our subjects reported holding paid jobs in 
  24Second Life, and their average hourly pay rates in those jobs are about a third of the 
average earnings rate from our experiment, converted to an hourly basis.  That our 
subjects’ trust game behaviors are not dramatically different from those in BDM or in the 
contemporaneous Second Life trust game experiments of Fiedler and collaborators and of 
Chesney et al., with considerably higher stakes, may be taken as another indication of 
incentive adequacy.  More pertinent, perhaps, is the fact that the large majority of 
subjects reported that the prospect of earnings was at least a moderately important 
motivation for participation, that they had good knowledge of the range of possible 
earnings when they entered the experiment, and that they found the range of earnings to 
be reasonable.  While we remain cautious about drawing strong conclusions from these 
findings, there appears to be enough evidence of incentive adequacy to justify exploration 
by means of further experimentation, which might involve both variation of earnings 
ranges and more intensive debriefing of subjects. 
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Figure 1. Picture of ‘lobby’ area of laboratory.  Subjects first clicked on the automated 
greeter to be welcomed to the lab, then on the booth to the right to be transported to a 
private treatment room. 
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Figure 2.  “OPTIMISTIC” and “CAUTIONARY” photos (top) and views of experiment 
rooms in corresponding treatments. 
 
  31Table 1a. Number of non-duplicate-IP observations, mean and standard deviations of 
sending by A (XA), for all observations and those with nonzero sending (XA > 0), by 
treatment. 
No. of A Obs.  Mean and Standard Deviation of Amt. Sent 
Treatment 
All XA > 0  Mean (All)  St. Dev. Mean XA> 0  St. Dev 
BASELINE 19  19 49.3  33.9  49.3  33.9 
COOPERATIVE 19  18  59.1  39.1  62.4  37.4 
COMPETITIVE 21  17  33.1  29.3  40.1  27.2 
OPTIMISTIC 23 22  70.4 36.0  73.6  33.3 
CAUTIONARY 29  27  48.9  38.4  52.5  37.2 
COOP-
OPTIMISTIC 
21 20  55.0 37.4  57.8  36.2 
COMP-
CAUTIONARY 
24 23  47.0 27.5  49.0  26.1 
Overall 156  146  51.8  35.7  55.3  34.2 
 
Table 1b. Number of non-duplicate-IP observations, mean and standard deviations of 
sending by B (XB), and B sending as a fraction of non-zero amount received (XB/3XA, 
given XA > 0), by treatment 
No. of B Obs.  Mean Amt. Sent  XB/3XA when XA > 0 
Treatment 
All Received  >  0  Mean  St. Dev. Mean  St. Dev 
BASELINE 23 23  86.3  80.9  .507  .305 
COOPERATIVE 22  20  108.18  86.8  .570  .199 
COMPETITIVE 16  12  41.8  56.0  .399  .323 
OPTIMISTIC 20  19  87.1 85.5  .443  .330 
CAUTIONARY 28  26  56.7  63.7  .418  .294 
COOP-
OPTIMISTIC 
21 20  78.8  79.2  .464  .315 
COMP-
CAUTIONARY 
23 22  74.2  66.3  .488  .307 
Overall 153  142  76.6  76.0  .473  .296 
Note: The number of B observations does not equal the number of A observations in 
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Table 2.  First-mover sending as a function of treatment and self-reported characteristics 
(Tobit regressions) 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 






























































































Female   2.6 
(7.9) 
      1.0 
(7.3) 
Student     -25.0*** 
(9.5) 
    -21.0* 
(11.1) 
Age       0.6 
(0.4) 
   -0.5 
(0.4) 










No.  of  obs.  156  156 156  156 156 156 156 
Log  likelihood  -612.1  -612.0 -608.7  -610.9 -603.6 -610.7 -600.5 
Prob > χ
2  0.0073  0.0134 0.0010  0.0058 0.0000 0.0050 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2  0.0142  0.0143 0.0196  0.0160 0.0278 0.0163 0.0328 
Notes: All regressions have 156 observations.  Omitted treatment dummy is BASELINE.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  *** = significant at 1% level; ** = 
significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level. 
 
  33Table 3.  Second-mover proportion returned as a function of treatment and self-reported 
characteristics (Tobit regressions) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 


















































































































Female   -0.012 
(0.065) 
     -0.019 
(0.061) 
Student     -0.174**
(0.074)
    -0.043 
(0.087) 
Age       0.010***
(0.003) 
   0.006* 
(0.004) 










No. of obs.  142  142  142  142  142  142  142 
Log likelihood  -81.54  -81.52  -78.81  -76.36  -78.26  -79.83  -73.27 
Prob > χ
2 0.8248  0.8886  0.3373 0.0828  0.2533  0.5341  0.0645 
Pseudo R
2 0.0216  0.0218  0.0544 0.0837  0.0610  0.0421  0.1208 
Notes: All regressions have 142 observations, that is all complete observations except 
those in which the first-mover sent zero.  Omitted treatment dummy is BASELINE.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  *** = significant at 1% level; ** = 
significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4. First-mover sending and second-mover proportion returned as functions of 
treatment and self-reported characteristics, for gender and age-segmented sub-
samples (Tobit regressions) 
  First Mover Sending, 
Segmented by Gender 
First Mover Sending, 
Segmented by Age 
Second Mover Sending, 
Segmented by Age 
 Male  Female  p-value Younger  Older  p-value Younger  Older  p-value  







































































































0.841            




0.039**  -19.2 
(10.3)* 
(omitted)   -0.14 
(0.08)* 
(omitted)   







































No. of obs.  82  74    88  68    78  64   
Log-
likelihood 
-590.40  -592.72  -63.68   
Chow test 
p>F 
0.0481**  0.0999  *  0.0288**   
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  *** = significant at 1% level; ** = 
significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level.  Median age was 26.5, with 48 
first-movers and 39 second-movers in this category.  These individuals were grouped 
with the “younger” group to minimize differences in segment size.  Reported p-values 
are those for F-tests of differences in coefficients across sub-sample regressions. 
 